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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken pursuant to the authority of Rules 3
and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (now the Utah
Rules of Apellate Procedure) and pursuant to the authority of
Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, paragraph 2(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A.

The issue for the decision of the Court of Appeal is:
Did the Responsent establish that there was a substan-

tial change in circumstances sufficient to support the Court's
ordered Modification of the Decree of Divorce?
B.

The standard of appellate review is set forth in a

number of Utah cases.

Appellant refers the Court to the

following cases and the accompanying quotations from such cases:
1. Naylor v. Naylor 700 P.2d 707 (1985):
On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree,
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree
itself. JId. at 710.
2.

Jeppson v^ Jeppson 684 P.2d 69 (1984):

Modificaton of a divorce decree is an equitable
matter. Although this Court may review both the facts
and the law, Christensen v. Christense Utah, 628 P.2d
1297, 1299 (1981), we typically accord "considerable
deference to the judgment of the trial court due to its
advantaged position and will not disturb the action of
that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to
the contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion
or misapplies principles of law." Id., Accord, e.g.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d 177 (1982);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 (1980). See
also Lord v^ Shaw [682 P.2d 853 (1984); Turner v^
Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982).

A p a r t y who r e q u e s t s a m o d i f i c a t i o n of a d i v o r c e
d e c r e e must i n i t i a l l y show t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l change i n
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a t l e a s t one of t h e p a r t i e s h a s
o c c u r r e d . . . . A r e l a t i v e c h a n g e i n t h e i n c o m e and
expenses of t h e p a r t i e s , i f c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t ,
can amount t o a s u b s t a n t i a l change of c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

STATUTES
Utah

Code T i t l e

30,

Chapter

3,

section

5,

paragraph

3

states:

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, or the distribution of the property as is
reasonable and necessary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondent petitioned the Court for a Modification of
the Decree of Divorce previously entered on March 10, 1983. The
Court, Judge Rigtrup presiding, granted the Petition for
Modification and increased the amount of child support for the
one remaining minor child from $175.00 per month to $300.00 per
month.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the time that the original Decree of Divorce was entered,
the Appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of
$175.00 per month for the two minor children of the parties based
upon monthly gross income of $3,138.58 (Findings of Fact re:
Modification, paragraph 10, pg 4).
At the time of the 1983 Decree, the Respondent was earning

gross monthly income of $1,401.00 (Findings of Fact re:
Modification, paragraph 13, pg 4).

The Appellant was then

earning 2.24 times the amount earned by the Respondent.
By the time that the Modification was granted, the Appellant
was

earning

$4,100.00

per

month

(Findings

of

Fact

re: Modification, paragraph 12, pg 4); and the Respondent was
earning $1,429.00 per month as gross income. (Findings of Fact,
re: Modification, paragraph 15, pg 4).

The Appellant was then

earning 2.92 times the amount earned by the Respondent.
The Court did not consider the income added to the household
of the Respondent as a result of the Respondents spouse's
contributions, nor did it consider the income earned by the minor
child of the parties.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED A MODIFICATION OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE AS THERE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION.

ARGUMENT
I. A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS GRANTED ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE
RESPONDENT FAILED TO MAKE SUCH A SHOWING IN THIS MATTER.
The facts of the case as set forth in the Findings of Fact
prepared by the Respondent are that in the five years between the

entry of the original Decree of Divorce and the filing of the
Petition for Modification, the Appellant's income went from 2.42
times the Respondent's income to 2.92 times the Respondent's
income.

In other words, the Appellant's income increased by 31

percent over the five year span while the Respondent's actual
income increased by but two percent over the same period of time.
However, the Court did not consider the contributions to the
income of the Respondent's household made by the Respondent's
spouse, nor the contributions to the Respondent's household made
by the minor child, who was of the age of sixteen at the time of
the hearing of the matter.

In fact, the Court stated from the

bench:
Based upon the proffered evidence, the Court does
find that there was a substantial and material
change of circumstances.
I think all the national studies and those of
us that are parents understand that braces and
glasses and the things that are involved, clothing,
other items, become more costly. So the Court does
observe the increase in age. . . . So, we understand
that there are costs incurred.
The difference
between 37,600 in 1983 in adjusted income in 1988
exceeding 50,000 [sic] is a significant increase.
The Court understands there's cost of living
increases at both homes, and it has the same affect
[sic] on both households. But I think it's clear
from what our Intermediate Court of Appeals has said
that the children are entitled to an adjustment for
part of the increases in revenue achieved.
Decision, p. 2, lines 5-21.
The sole factor considered by the Court, with any degree of
specificity, was the Appellant's 31 percent increase in income.
The 1978 Utah case of Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 states the
very basic proposition that "there can be no justification for
changing the decree unless there is a showing of substantial
change in circumstances." l^d. at 912. The case further states:

While the increase in the defendants income is
certainly an important factor to consider, this
proposition is also true: the fact that a man may so
use his abilities as to increase his income should
not necessarily impose a penalty upon him by
automatically increasing his obligations under a
divorce decree. The increase in income is only to be
considered along with the other facts and
circumstances concerning the needs of the children
and the ability of the father and mother to provide
for them.
Jxi. at 913
The error made by the trial Court in this matter was the
failure of the Court to consider "other facts and circumstances
concerning the needs of the children and the ability of the
father and mother to provide for them." supra.
The burden of proving a change of circumstances rests on the
party seeking the modification (See

Christensen v. Christensen,

628 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1981) and the Respondent failed to prove
that there was a substantial change in circumstances as no proof
was proffered concerning the monetary needs of the children or
the ability of the mother and her spouse to pay for the children.
The fact that the Appellant!s income increased by 31 percent
over the time period is not, in itself, proof positive that there
has been a substantial change in circumstances. The matter of
Jeppson v. Jeppson

684 P.2d 69 (1984) speaks to the issue of

termination of an award of alimony six years after the entry of
the Divorce decree.

The Court found that the child of the

parties voluntarily moved from wife!s residence, that the husband
now carried the burden of child support for the child, and that
the wife had sustantial assets with which to support herself.
Addressing the issue of a modification in the decree, the Court
states:

A party who requests a modification of a divorce
decree must initially show that a substantial change
in the circumstances of at least one of the parties
has occurred. . . . A relative change in the income
and expenses of the parties, if comparatively
significant, can amount to a substantial change in
circumstances. _Id_. at 70.
Adding to the above criteria regarding the granting of a
modification, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Naylor v.
Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (1985), comments that:
On a petition for modification of a divorce decree,
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of
a substantial change of circumstances occurring since
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the
decree itself. Id., at 710
In Naylor, it was contemplated that the wife's income would
increase at a rate commensurate with the income of the husband,
however, while the husband's income doubled, the wife's income
remained

the same.

In the instant case, there was no

speculation or contemplation at the time of the divorce regarding
the Respondent's projected income.

The Appellant's income has

also not doubled, but has increased but 31 percent over the five
years, an average raise of but six percent per annum.

Finally,

there was no evidence produced at trial regarding the minor
child's increased expenses.
There was no proof of increased expenses, no proof of the
Respondent's husband's income, and no substantial change in
circumstances when the Appellant receives but a six percent raise
per year.

CONCLUSION

The Respondent did not meet the burden of proof necessary to

establish a substantial change in circumstances warranting an
increase of 100% in the amount of child support paid.

The

Respondent did show there was an increase of 31 percent in the
Appellant's income, but nothing was proved or offered concerning
increased expenses of the child, the contribution of income of
the spouse of the Respondent to the household, or the need of the
child for additional support of 100%.
Therefore, the matter should be remanded to the trial court
with an order instructing the trial court to dismiss the Petition
for Modification and granting to the Appellant his costs and
fees.
Dated this \

day of April, 1990.

DEAN H. BECKER
Attorney for Appellant

